QuantAMM Researching AMM MEV Protection Solutions

馃攼 MEV Protection Breakthrough?

By Balancer
May 9, 2024, 6:26 PM
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The QuantAMM team is currently researching solutions to optimize Automated Market Maker (AMM) protection against Miner Extractable Value (MEV) attacks.​ One area of focus is analyzing whether dynamically weighted liquidity pools, such as Liquidity Bootstrapping Pools (LBPs), introduce new MEV attack vectors, and if so, developing inter-block protections to guard against them.​

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The QuantAMM team is researching solutions to optimize AMM MEV protection. One avenue has been to analyze if dynamically weighted LPs such as LBPs introduce new MEV attack vectors, and if so, what inter-block protections could be developed to guard against them. Check it out

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New Research Alert 馃攳 How does changing weights between blocks in dynamic G3M (such as TFMMs and balancer liquidity bootstrap pools) affect potential attack vectors? New approaches in modelling have led to the ability to run over 450m attack simulations for MEV protection

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